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“The Guidance of an Enterprise Economy” by Martin Shubik and
Eric Smith is an ambitious attempt to study the functioning of large
economies using ideas from physics, biology, chemistry, and game the-
ory. This essay presents an overview of the book’s contributions.
∗Department of Economics, University of California, San Diego, La Jolla, CA 92093,
U.S.A. E-mail: jsobel@ucsd.edu.
1 Introduction
A few months ago, my return trip from a European conference involved
changing planes in Washington D.C. The first flight went fine and I boarded
the plane for the Washington – San Diego segment. One hour later, after
being informed that there was a problem with the plane, I disembarked. Two
hours later, the flight was cancelled. It took several more hours to negotiate
an alternate route. The delays provided a perfect time to become angry with
the airline, technology, and many other aspects of modern life. Somehow,
these bitter emotions changed into awe. I arrived home twelve hours later the
expected, more exhausted than usual, but otherwise in fine shape. I managed
to travel half way across the world in about thirty hours. A complex machine
failed. A complicated network of connections managed to find a replacement.
Many details were unpleasant, but the final outcome was not too different
from what I expected. I assume that 250 other displaced passengers had a
similar experience (perhaps without the awe).
Air travel is just an example of the extraordinarily complex processes that
we take for granted. Shubik and Smith’s book provides a multi-disciplinary
foundation for the study of large-scale market interactions that is rich enough
to generate insights into how systems work. The authors are aware that
complex systems may fail and that the failures may lead to consequences
far worse than a twelve-hour delay. They seek to describe ways in which
imperfect people can create and govern complicated institutions well enough
to avoid disastrous outcomes and secure good outcomes frequently.
2 Moving Beyond General Equilibrium
The starting point for the analysis is the theory of general equilibrium. A fo-
cus of mathematical economics in the 1950s, general-equilibrium theory is an
elegant formulation of economic interaction. The theory provides a precise
description of the interaction between goal-oriented agents producing and ex-
changing goods. The theory delivers three central results. The first result is
an existence theorem that shows the coherence of the model and captures the
intuition that it is possible to find prices that equate supply to demand. The
other results are the two fundamental theorems of welfare economics: con-
ditions under which an equilibrium is Pareto efficient and conditions under
which any Pareto-efficient allocation can be viewed as an equilibrium (with
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appropriate initial conditions). Thanks to deep insights from the founders
of this theory, one could view the results as applying to economies under
uncertainty and to dynamic environments. General-equilibrium theory is a
beautiful development and has long been a starting point for theoretical anal-
ysis of markets. Elegance comes at a cost. Shubik and Smith touch on many
of the limitations of the general-equilibrium paradigm and describe ways to
go beyond the framework. Describing the limitations provides an outline of
the book’s contributions.
General-equilibrium theory assumes that players are price takers. There
are many situations in which individuals do have market power. There is now
a well developed class of models that permit strategic behavior (Shubik and
his co-authors created this literature). The book serves as an introduction
(to those who need one) to the study of market games. Game theory is the
study of multi-player decision problem.
A game consists of a set of players, a strategy set for each player, and pay-
off functions for each player. To go from a general-equilibrium description
of a market to a market game, one must specify how the market institu-
tion works. One possibility is that each agent describes how much he or
she is willing to trade (for each item, possibly as a function of price, time,
or location) and a “black box” (or reduced-form model of market clearing)
determines which agents transact and the transaction prices on the basis of
these reported trades. The realized trades determine the payoffs of agents.
The fundamental difference between market games and general equilibrium
is that in a market game economic agents take into account how their behav-
ior influences the terms of trade while in general equilibrium agents assume
their demand behavior does not influence prices.
It is problematic to include money in general-equilibrium models. The
basic framework does not include the trading frictions that make it costly to
have direct trades between all pairs of commodities. Even when one takes
trading costs into account, there are significant conceptual issues surrounding
which commodity (or commodities) will be honored in exchange and the
conditions under which an item of no intrinsic value (a sheet of paper, a
piece of plastic, a bitcoin) will be accepted as payment for goods that are
directly useful. The book provides a coherent framework for the study of
monetary exchange. The framework permits one to understand the factors
that lead to an evolution from commodity money to fiat money and the
institutions needed to support a monetary economy.
The problems that price-taking agents solve in general equilibrium are
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simple to describe: taking prices as given, they select consumption and pro-
duction levels to maximize their utility or profit. Even assuming that agents
know all of the parameters in these problems, the optimizations involve many
variables and would be challenging to solve.1 These complications multiply
when agents take into account the implications of their behavior on prices
and make decisions at different points in time. Shubik and Smith take these
complexities seriously. The book contains useful discussions of realistic goals
to assume for goal-oriented agents (making the case that innovators may
not be utility maximizers) and aim to construct models that are testable in
laboratories.
One amazing feature of the theory of general equilibrium is that market
equilibria, which nominally depend on decentralized decision making, are
efficient. The invisible hand of the price system directs behavior towards
non wasteful outcomes without help from any governance structures. In
fact, institutions do exist. They are essential for providing public goods, but
Shubik and Smith explore their value in building trust in money, reducing
complexity, helping agents arrive at equilibria, and motivating innovation.
Shubik and Smith’s book is not about air travel, but my flight/plight
illustrates some places where general-equilibrium theory hides important de-
tails. In a basic general-equilibrium model, I wouldn’t buy a plane ticket.
Instead I would have a claim on services that depended on all possible con-
tingencies. In theory, I would know in advance what would happen to me
if the Washington–San Diego plane broke down. The richness needed for a
complete contract is complicated beyond belief.2
General-equilibrium theory explains neither how I managed to purchase
the ticket nor or the process that determined the price. Somehow the airline
was willing to promise me a seat on the plane in exchange for my credit card
information and a promise to honor certain conditions. There is a lot going
on. The airline was confident that it would receive the equivalent of cash
from my promises and also that it could later use the cash for something
intrinsically valuable. I was confident (perhaps too confident) that there
would be a seat on the airplane for me and the plane would fly as scheduled.
1Another issue is that these problems may have many solutions, but equilibrium typ-
ically requires that the decision maker chose in a specific way when indifferent. Hence
equilibrium theory gives no insight into how one arrives at equilibrium.
2This does not mean that real life is simple. The airlines do not simply sell tickets on a
particular flight. The commodity changes depending on where you sit on the plane, how
many bags you check, and even when you purchase the ticket.
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Part comes from institutions that have the authority to support aspects of
the contract. Part comes from informal mechanisms that operate over time.
In addition to my credit card, the airline was aware of another currency –
frequent flier miles – that indicated to them my loyalty and potential future
value to the firm and, under certain conditions, I could use in lieu of money
to exchange for airline services. Hence several of the featured elements of
the book’s treatise – complexity alternative media of exchange, dynamics,
institutions, innovation, and strategic interaction – already arise in my simple
story.
To go beyond general-equilibrium theory, Shubik and Smith build on es-
sentially all of the main developments of economic theory over the past 65
years. They honor the 1950s growth models of Von Neumann and Gale. They
invoke 1960s results that provide foundations for the intuition that price tak-
ing is a good approximation to strategic behavior in large markets. They use
ideas from the development of non-cooperative games that were developed in
the 1970s. They adapt their theories so that are can be tested using experi-
mental methods that gained prominence in the 1980s. They appreciate, but
take a nuanced and somewhat skeptical view, towards models of bounded
rationality that are part of the recent boom in behavioral economics.
3 From Theory to Applications
General-equilibrium theory does not provide clear structure for someone in-
terested in predicting or preventing financial crises. Surely the guidance that
Shubik and Smith wish to explore could be relevant to stabilization policy.
This book is work of theory, but the authors have advice for policy makers.3
At a high level, the lesson from the book is that theorists who wish to influ-
ence policy must open their black-box theories and explicitly include policy
instruments. More practically, Shubik and Smith show how to construct
toy models of “playable games” that are rich enough to permit interesting
phenomena while simple enough to solve analytically, simulate, and test in
laboratory settings.
3I could find only one explicit policy proposal. In Section 13.10, the authors describe
a Federal Employment Reserve Agency. FERA would be an independent federal agency
charged with stabilization the employment level in the same way that the Federal Reserve
currently works to stabilize the rate of inflation. The brief discussion acknowledges that
any such institution would be imperfect.
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4 Economics and Science
The book points out connections between physics, biology, and chemistry.
From physics, the main ideas are symmetry, dimension, and measurement.
I would have liked to see a more formal discussion of these connections.
Here are two examples. First, the authors propose that measurement is
characterized by three properties: same operation independent of quantity,
the ability to change units of measurement, and the ability to subdivide.
These requirements suggest that measurement can be through of as a real-
valued homogeneous function on a vector space that is invariant with respect
to (at least) positive linear transformations. Although the authors apparently
do not equate measurement with measure theory, but I am not confident that
I have properly operationalized their definition.4 Second, the book mentions
Gauge Symmetries in 4.4.2 but, even though the connection to market models
is made explicit, the book only points out the formal similarity. It does
illustrate how one can use formal similarity to get a deeper understanding of
economic institutions.
The connection to biology and the guidance of markets is less formal. Here
the authors point out some parallels between stability of organisms that must
survive in an uncertain world to the central problems of their study. One
aspect of this parallelism that could be developed is the balance between
active governance of economic processes and the evolution of decentralized
institutions that can regulate behavior. Analogies with evolution seem to
be more closely associated with decentralized control rather than centralized
guidance.
There is less emphasis on the relationship between the authors’ approach
and chemistry, but they make the useful connection between institutions and
chemical catalysts in that they facilitate productive activities without being
consumed.5 I would go further and say that some institutions are enhanced
by their repeated use. A chemical catalyst facilitates a chemical reaction, but
the catalyst returns to its initial condition upon completion of the chemical
reaction. An economic institution may facilitate an economic transaction.
When the transaction is complete, the institution will not only remain, but
it may be stronger than it was before. People will have more trust in an
4In contrast, the book contains careful and insightful discussions of the importance of
time scale in their analyses.
5As the authors point out, the formal connection between the input-output matrices of
linear growth models and stoichiometric matrices makes this more than a good analogy.
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institution that has performed well in the past. The added trust could lead
more people to use the institution. Chemical catalysts are not enhanced by
positive reputations, but economic institutions are.
5 A Missing Link
Laboratory experiments have become a standard tool for economists. The
authors identify the two biggest values of the approach – experiments make
it possible to test hypotheses of economic models in controlled settings and
they provide a low-cost way to see how novel institutions or interventions
function prior to introducing them to the natural economy. The success of
experiments to test designs for auctions and school-choice mechanisms has
received broad recognition and attention. The goals of Shubik and Smith’s
book are closely aligned to the broad objectives of mechanism design and
recent emphasis on testing potential institutions.
6 How to Read the Book
The book avoids the dry theorem-proof exposition typical of mathematical
economics. For the most part, the text provides verbal descriptions of for-
mal models. The authors have given a lot of thought to technicalities, but
they deliberately avoid making the most general statements to broaden their
audience. This choice is consistent with their desire to provide models that
would generate predictions that could be computed or simulated and tested
in the laboratory. They provide formal models in the text and in appendices,
but for the most part spare the readers of details. This was the right choice
for exposition of the model, but it sometimes makes for challenging reading.
The notation is consistent, but ever expanding and not intuitive. Because
the paper does not systematically identify theorems, the reader does not get
enough guidance about which results are the most important.
Chapter 5 based on the author’s 2011 Journal of Mathematical Economics
article “Endogenizing the provision of money: costs of commodity and fiat
moneys in relation to the valuation of trade.” I view it as the theoretical
center of the paper. Earlier chapters motivate and describe the basic frame-
work and illustrate the authors’ approach. Later chapters add to the models
of Chapter 5, leading to what the authors call a “hyperastronomical explo-
6
sion of special cases” developed in subsequent chapters.6 The explosion is a
consequence of the ambition of the authors and the complexity of the general
model. On one hand, they pose a large number of interesting questions. On
the other hand, it is not possible to arrive at answers to all of the questions
at the same time. Their approach, keeping with a broader tradition, is to
push the analysis of different special cases as far as possible. Chapter 5 com-
pares the operation of a dynamic market game with commodity monetary
system (gold) and fiat money. Fiat money is an artificial commodity used to
pay administrative salaries, which are in turn funded through taxation. Pro-
vided that administrators do their job (essentially by supporting the value of
money by enforcing contracts), agents will use it in equilibrium to eliminate
intertemporal trading frictions.
One must be impressed with the breadth of knowledge the authors display.
The work directly invokes results, ideas, and methods from other scientific
disciplines. The authors place their contribution in context, displaying en-
cyclopedic knowledge of the development of the basic ideas from economic
theory. The text contains many asides and short subsections that point to-
wards the broader relevance of the book’s ideas. The footnotes contain sharp
and sometimes amusing asides on topics ranging from political philosophy to
Greek mythology. I felt like I was in the company of wise, generous, but
somewhat undisciplined dinner hosts, who prepared more than enough of
their favorite dishes, and happily share details about the ingredients and
preparation. I reacted like a dazzled guest. I was happy to be invited to the
feast, but unable to savor individual dishes and sometimes anxious to push
away from the table. My recommendation to a potential reader is to read the
book selectively, picking out attractive segments rather than moving through
the book linearly.
6The development calls to mind Italo Calvino’s Mr. Palomar who “needed a great
variety of models, whose elements could be combined in order to arrive at the one that
would best fit reality, a reality that, for its own part, was always made up of many different
realities, in time and in space.”
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